served that the N-word "is and has long been the most socially consequential racial insult. . . . [But today] when African Americans are speaking to each other, 'nigger,'and especially its more genial cousin, 'nigga' can be an affectionate greeting, a compliment, or a term of respect." 10 In 2007, rapper Nas wanted to title his new album "Niggas" until pressure from his record label and civil rights activists convinced him otherwise. 11 During a 2009 television interview with Jay-Z, Oprah Winfrey explained that to her, the N-word "carries such a sense of hatred and degradation, [that when she hears the word she] always think [s] . . . about black men who were lynched and that's the last word they heard." 12 Jay-Z disagreed, opining, "People give words power. . . .
[O]ur generation . . . took the power out of that word. We turned a word that was very ugly and hurtful into a term of endearment . . . ." 13 But if members of the black community cannot reach a consensus on proper use of the N-word, how can courts and juries be expected to determine whether its intraracial use is sufficient to create a racially hostile work environment, and how should that determination be made? Should the race of the speaker and target of the speech be taken into account in determining the existence of a racially hostile work environment? In the alternative, if our legal system presumes that the N-word is per se racially offensive, regardless of the speaker's race and intent in using the word, does that restore power to a hurtful word that an empowered new generation of black Americans has stripped of its old meaning and refashioned into a term of endearment and solidarity?
Although strikingly different opinions on use of the N-word have provoked much debate, the conclusions reached in Johnson and Weatherly-that intraracial use of the N-word can create a racially folk in this country not unlike the numbers branded on the bodies of living Jews in concentration camps . . . .").
10. Steve Bogira, A Tough Lesson About the N-Word, CHI. READER, Jan. 22, 2013, at 14, 15, available at http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/teacher-lincoln-brown-sues-cps-over-nword/ Content?oid=8556801 (last visited Mar. 5, 2014) (quoting Professor Randall Kennedy).
11. See Catherine Donaldson-Evans, Record Label Denies Rap Star Nas' Claim of Forthcoming Album Called "Nigga," FOXNEWS.COM (Oct. 16, 2007) , http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/ 10/16/record-label-denies-rap-star-nas-claim-forthcoming-album-called-nigga/. As of the date of this publication, the album remains untitled.
12. The Oprah Winfrey Show: Jay-Z on the N-Word, (syndicated television broadcast Sept. 24, 2009), available at http://www.oprah.com/oprahshow/Jay-Z-on-the-N-word-Video [hereinafter Jay-Z Video]; see also Crystal Wright, When Is It Ever OK To Call the President the N-Word?, CNN (July 8, 2014, 6:41 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/08/opinion/wright-obama-n-word (criticizing West View News for publishing a story with the headline "The Nigger in the White House" and describing the N-word as "reprehensible").
13. Jay-Z Video, supra note 12.
black cemetery in Detroit. 17 Reverend Wendell Anthony explained, "We are committed to ending hate-word and talk. It doesn't do anyone any good, whether it's a journalist on TV or a rapper on the radio." 18 Likewise, the late poet Maya Angelou described the N-word as "dangerous and vulgar" and took issue when the rapper Common featured her reciting poetry on a track that also included the Nword. 19 Other members of the black community have discouraged use of the N-word and blame rap music for popularizig it. During the infamous O.J. Simpson trial, black prosecutor Christopher Darden described the N-word as the "filthiest, dirtiest, nastiest word in the English language." 20 Not surprisingly, the N-word has long been the subject of controversy in locker rooms, classrooms, and courtrooms across America. In an April 22, 1947 game against the Philadelphia Phillies, Major League Baseball's first black player, Jackie Robinson, was asked, "Hey, ni**er, why don't you go back to the cotton field where you belong?" 21 Nearly thirty years later in 1973, black right fielder Hank Aaron received increasingly vicious hate mail the closer he came to breaking Babe Ruth's home run record. 22 Fast forward to November 2013, when black Los Angeles Clippers player Matt Barnes tweeted about his black teammates: "I love my teammates like family, but I'm DONE standing up for these [ni**as]!" 23 Although Mr. Barnes was criticized for his use of the Nword, former NBA player Charles Barkley came to his defense on national television, remarking "I use the N-word. I'm going to continue to use the N-word . . . . White America don't [sic] get to dictate how me and Shaq talk to each other." 24 From the basketball court to the classroom, the N-word has sparked controversy. In 2011, a University of Connecticut student filed a complaint against a teaching assistant who used the N-word during an an- (Nov. 14, 2013, 8 :44 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ early-lead/wp/2013/11/14/matt-barnes-tweets-n-word-in-frustration-with-clippers/.
24. BARKLEY BROADCAST, supra note 5; see also Billy Haisley, supra note 5. "Shaq" refers to former NBA player Shaquille O'Neal. thropology lesson examining the demeaning effect of a racial slur. 25 That same year, an Alabama publishing company feared controversy when it decided to substitute "slave" for the N-word in Mark Twain's classic, Huckleberry Finn. 26 Perhaps " [t] he omnipresence of racebased attitudes and experiences in the lives of black Americans causes even nonviolent events to be interpreted as degrading, threatening, and offensive." 27 The N-word has also long been the subject of legal controversy. The first recorded use of the N-word in a legal proceeding occurred in Blywe v. United States, an 1871 case involving two white men accused of murdering several members of a black family. 28 During a 1932 trial in Atlanta, Georgia, a hostile witness used the N-word to refer to a young black defendant. 29 When his black defense attorney asked the white judge to intervene because the N-word was "objectionable, prejudicial, and insulting," the judge responded, "I don't know whether it is or not. . . . However, I'll instruct the witness to call [the defendant] 'darky,' which is a term of endearment." 30 Times may have changed, but the meaning often associated with the N-word has not. In Spriggs v. Diamond Autoglass, the Fourth Circuit characterized the N-word as "pure anathema to African Americans." 31 As of July 2001, the racial slur "kike" appeared in 84 cases, "wetback" in 50, "gook" in 90, "honky" in 286, and "nigger" in 4,219. 32 As of February 2014, the racial slur "kike" appeared in 105 federal cases, "wetback" in 334, "gook" in 113, "honky" in 105, and "nigger" in 5,162. 33 Perhaps nowhere has use of the N-word been more hotly debated than in the context of race-based hostile work environment claims involving use of the N-word at the workplace.
Purbita Saha, T.A. Defends Use of N-Word in
Class, DAILY CAMPUS (Apr. 25, 2011), http:/ /www.dailycampus.com/news/t-a-defends-use-of-n-word-in-class-1.2206419#.UwzXQP1RZBU.
26. Marc Schultz, Upcoming NewSouth "Huck Finn" Eliminates the "N" Word, PUBLISHERS WKLY., Jan. 3, 2011, at 6, available at http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industrynews/publisher-news/article/45645-upcoming-newsouth-huck-finn-eliminates-the-n-word.html. The original manuscript reportedly uses the N-word an astonishing 219 times. 
B. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) prohibits a covered employer from discriminating against a covered employee or applicant with respect to the "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 34 Congress intended Title VII to "strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment . . . in employment." 35 To prevail in a racially hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the harassing conduct (1) occurred because of race; (2) was unwelcome; (3) was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment or to create an abusive work environment; and (4) would have been considered objectively hostile by a reasonable person. 36 A court will also consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the conduct at issue constitutes harassment. 37 By way of illustration, a plaintiff might allege that her supervisor often referred to her as the N-word, that coworkers frequently circulated racist jokes at the workplace, and that her complaints about the aforementioned behavior elicited no response.
Rogers v. EEOC appears to be the first case to recognize a cause of action based upon a racially hostile work environment. 38 There, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a Hispanic complainant can establish a Title VII violation by demonstrating that her employer created a hostile work environment for employees by giving discriminatory service to Hispanic clientele. 39 The Fifth Circuit determined that Title VII includes "within its protective ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination." 40 However, it cautioned that "mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive 34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). Title VII defines an "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person," with certain exclusions. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(a feelings in an employee" is insufficient to prevail in a claim because Title VII does not create a general civility code for the workplace. 41 The Fifth Circuit may have had the first word on what constitutes a racially hostile work environment, but it certainly did not have the last. In 2013, courts in New York and Alabama upheld jury verdicts in favor of black employees who claimed that their black supervisors' use of the N-word at the workplace created a racially hostile work environment. 42 As will be discussed in more detail below, these outcomes are correct because they comport with well-settled employment discrimination law recognizing the realities of in-group discrimination, account for the effects of implicit race bias, and promote fairness, consistency, and judicial efficiency. 52 Notably, the jury reached this conclusion even though Mr. Carmona self-identified as a black male of Latino descent and claimed that he was not using the N-word in a derogatory way. 53 The defendants emphasized that the March 2012 conversation was the only time Mr. Carmona referred to Ms. Johnson as the N-word, and that she had not heard him use that word to refer to anyone else. 54 Furthermore, although Ms. Johnson did not recall using the N-word at the office, 55 at least some witness testimony indicated that Ms. Johnson did use the N-word in everyday conversation, albeit not at work. 56 67 According to Ms. Weatherly, Ms. Bartley regularly used the N-word at the office, once even commenting that she was "sick and tired of this ni**er shit." 68 Ms. Weatherly complained about Ms. Bartley's remarks, but when Human Resources took no action, she transferred to a different department. 69 Ms. Bartley also allegedly directed terms, such as "ni**er," "ni**a," "ni**a shit," "fat bitch," and "white bitch" at Ms. Burkhalter, other coworkers, and even Ms. Burkhalther's seven-year-old son. 70 Ms. Bartley also commented, "I'm sick of this ni**a shit. These stupid bitches can't do anything right. And they ain't nothing but some ni**as." 71 When Ms. Burkhalter's complaints elicited no response, she filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and was terminated shortly thereafter. 72 According to Ms. Williams, Ms. Bartley "consistently" referred to her as a "ni**er" and "bitch" and made racially charged comments, such as "talk to the ni**er side of the hand because the white side does not want to hear it" and "we got to dress professional; 65. 728 F.3d at 1266-70. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court's failure to reraise the issue of severance sua sponte was not reviewable for abuse of discretion, that denial of a motion to sever the Employees' claims was not an abuse of discretion, that the Eleventh Circuit lacked jurisdiction to hear the defendant's appeal of the district court's denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, that evidence established that the employees attempted to mitigate damages as required to support an award of front pay, and that the defendant waived its unclean hands claim. 74 The Employees sued ASU on March 4, 2010, alleging, inter alia, a racially hostile work environment. 75 After the district court denied ASU's motion to sever the Employees' claims, a consolidated trial commenced on February 8, 2012. 76 ASU moved for judgment as a matter of law as to each claim but was denied. 77 Among other things, the jury concluded that the Employees had experienced a race-based hostile work environment. 78 The district court entered final judgment on May 25, 2012, awarding over $1 million in damages. 79 ASU appealed, but the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 80 The outcomes in Johnson and Weatherly may surprise members of the black community who consider intraracial use of the N-word acceptable and even empowering, but as discussed in more detail below, the conclusions in both cases are entirely consistent with the spirit and purpose of Title VII and other antidiscrimination statutes, which have long recognized in-group discrimination.
C. In-Group Discrimination
It is well settled that members of a protected group can discriminate against other members of the same group. In Castaneda v. Partida, the Supreme Court of the United States concluded that a prima facie showing of discrimination against Mexican-Americans in a county's grand jury selection could not be rebutted merely by showing that Mexican-Americans held a "governing majority" of elective offices in the county. 81 According to Justice Harry Blackmun, "Because of the many facets of human motivation, it would be unwise to presume as a matter of law that human beings of one definable group will not discriminate against other members of their group." 82 all members of all minority groups[ ] have an "inclination to assure fairness" to other members of their group. . . . [Such] assumptions about human nature, plausible as they may sound, fly in the face of a great deal of social science theory and research. Social scientists agree that members of minority groups frequently respond to discrimination and prejudice by attempting to disassociate themselves from the group, even to the point of adopting the majority's negative attitudes towards the minority. Such behavior occurs with particular frequency among members of minority groups who have achieved some measure of economic or political success and thereby have gained some acceptability among the dominant group. 83 The Supreme Court subsequently extended this reasoning to the employment discrimination context. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., the Supreme Court held that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII. 84 There, Joseph Oncale worked as a roustabout on an oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico. 85 Several members of Mr. Oncale's eight-man crew subjected him to sex-related insults and actions, including insinuations that he was a homosexual, physical assaults, and threats of rape. 86 When Sundowner ignored Mr. Oncale's complaints, he resigned, requesting that his pink slip indicate he "voluntarily left due to sexual harassment and verbal abuse." 87 Mr. Oncale sued Sundowner in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, but the district court held that his claim was not actionable because he and his alleged harassers were members of the same sex. 88 The Fifth Circuit affirmed. 89 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable even when the harassing conduct occurs between members of the same sex and is not motivated by sexual desire. 90 The Supreme Court observed that Title VII prohibits discrimination "because of sex" and rejected a "conclusive presumption that an employer will not discriminate against members of his own race." 91 The Supreme Court did not observe anything in Title VII's plain language or in any precedent interpreting it that would support a categorical exclusion of in-group harassment. 92 Although same-sex sexual harassment was "not the principal evil" that prompted Title VII's enact- 94 The outcomes in Johnson and Weatherly are consistent with the longstanding recognition of in-group discrimination, because in both cases, the juries refused to presume that the supervisor did not harass or discriminate against the employee or employees on the basis of race merely because the supervisor and the employee or employees were both black. 95 In other words, there is no legal presumption that intraracial use of the N-word is insufficient to create a racially hostile work environment.
D. Third-Party Associative Discrimination
The outcomes in Johnson and Weatherly also comport with precedent acknowledging the evils of third-party associative discrimination. Third-party associative discrimination occurs when an individual is discriminated against because of her association with another group or individual, specifically those protected under Title VII. 96 In other words, a person is discriminated against not because of the group to which she belongs, but rather because of her association with a protected group or its members.
A plaintiff alleging third-party associative discrimination must establish that the discrimination resulted from her association with a member of a protected group. By way of illustration, consider the following: John Doe is a white male who is married to Jane, a black female. John applies for a job at XYZ Corporation (XYZ) for which he is well qualified. However, the interviewer at XYZ who has hiring and firing authority denies John the position because the interviewer does not approve of John's interracial marriage. John sues XYZ under Title VII for unlawful failure to hire because of race. Although XYZ did not discriminate against John because of his race, it did discriminate against him because of his interracial romantic association with Jane, a black female. In this scenario, John has been a victim of thirdparty associative discrimination.
A plaintiff alleging third-party associative discrimination may have difficulty establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Some courts have denied third-party associative discrimination claims for lack of standing because one could argue that the discrimination is based on the race of a third party-here, Jane-rather than the race of the plaintiff. 97 These courts reason that permitting third-party associative discrimination claims contravenes the plain language of Title VII, which prohibits discrimination because of "such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin," not that of a third party. 98 The minority approach rigidly adheres to a strict interpretation of Title VII without considering that a broader interpretation may better effectuate the statute's spirit and purpose. 99 However, most courts do recognize that while the statutory language of Title VII does not explicitly prohibit third-party associative discrimination, denying such claims for lack of standing contravenes the law's spirit and purpose-that is, deterring discrimination and creating equal employment opportunities for protected groups. 100 As the Fifth Circuit explained in Culpepper v. Reynolds Metal Co., Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act provides us with a clear mandate from Congress that no longer will the United States tolerate this form of discrimination. It is, therefore, the duty of the courts to make sure that the Act works, and the intent of Congress is not hampered by a combination of a strict construction of the statute and a battle with semantics. 101 The Eleventh Circuit elaborated on this reasoning in Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Co., a case involving an otherwise qualified white male who was purportedly denied employment because of his marriage to a black woman. 102 There, the Eleventh Circuit explained that when a plaintiff alleges that she has been discriminated against because of a third-party association, she is, by definition, alleging that she has been discriminated against because of race, and she need not specify that in her complaint. 103 Other circuits have followed suit, prohibiting discrimination resulting from interracial romantic associations. In Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., a white female sued Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Walmart), alleging discrimination due to her romantic relationship with a black male employee. 104 The Fifth Circuit concluded that Walmart discriminated against the plaintiff "because of [her] race (white)" due to her interracial relationship, and that Title VII prohibits such discrimination. 105 It further determined that Walmart's proffered reason for terminating the plaintiff-that she "shopped the clock"-was a mere pretext for discriminating on the basis of her interracial relationship. 106 Likewise, in Ross v. Douglas County, a black prison guard successfully sued his employer after his black supervisor called him the N-word and "black boy" and referred to his white wife as "whitey." 107 The court rejected the defendant's argument that, as a matter of law, a black person could not subject another black person to a racially hostile work environment, relying on Justice Thurgood Marshall's conclusion in Castaneda that "it would be unwise to presume as a matter of law that human beings of one definable group will not discriminate against other members of their group." 108 In Ellis v. United Parcel Service, Inc., a black employee alleged that a black female supervisor had discriminated against him because he dated and subsequently married a white coworker. 109 The Employee Relations Manager, a black female, purportedly made multiple negative remarks about the plaintiff's interracial relationship to the plaintiff and his direct supervisor, who was also a black female. 110 The Seventh Circuit neither presumed that a black supervisor would not discriminate against a fellow black person because of race, nor concluded that an employer cannot be held liable for Title VII discrimination when it discriminates against an employee because the employee is involved in an interracial romantic relationship. Instead, the court held that Ellis did not demonstrate that he was treated worse than 103 similarly situated employees who violated the nonfraternization policy and were subject to the same decision maker. 111 Several federal appellate courts, including the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits, have even extended protection to nonromantic interracial associations. For example, in DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., a white male alleged that he was forced to retire early because he sold his home to a black person. 112 The Second Circuit held that the plaintiff had standing to sue because he had been discriminated against for "vindicating the right of a black fellow-employee 'to make . . . [a] contract . . .' similar to that which whites in the neighborhood have freely been able to make." 113 Likewise, in Sperling v. United States, 114 a white union grievance representative claimed that the U.S. Army denied him a promotion because he successfully represented a black employee. 115 In denying the government's motion to dismiss, the court concluded that Title VII should not be so narrowly construed as to preclude Mr. Sperling's claim simply because the discrimination resulted from his association with a black man, rather than from Mr. Sperling's own race. 116 In sum, the outcomes in Johnson and Weatherly are consistent with the longstanding recognition of third-party associative discrimination. This legal doctrine underscores that in the employment context, individuals of the same racial background may be on opposite ends of racial discrimination in the employment setting-one discriminating and the other being the victim of discrimination.
E. Selecting the Proper Standard
A workplace "permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult'" sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment can create a hostile work 116. Id. at 484. Title VII also prohibits covered employers from retaliating against an applicant or employee with respect to any aspect of employment because the individual filed an EEOC Charge, complained of discrimination to the employer, or participated in an employment discrimination proceeding, such as an EEOC investigation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012).
environment. 117 To prevail on a racially hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff must establish, inter alia, that a "reasonable person" would have found the conduct "hostile or abusive." 118 The Merriam-Webster Dictionary describes the N-word as "perhaps the most offensive and inflammatory racial slur" in the English language. 119 It is no surprise that given the N-word's dark history, many, if not most, courts have concluded that a reasonable person of any race would find its use at the workplace objectionable.
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that in the context of a hostile environment claim, the objective severity of harassment is determined from the perspective of a "reasonable person." 120 For example, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, the Supreme Court observed that "[c]onduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment-an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title VII's purview." 121 The Supreme Court further outlined a nonexhaustive list of factors, such as the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, that could be examined to determine the severity and pervasiveness of the conduct. Significantly, that list omits the race of the speaker, instead focusing exclusively on the experience and perspective of the target of the speech. 122 Naturally, some lower courts have relied on the Supreme Court's use of the "reasonable person standard" to explicitly reject the view that the objective severity of the harassment should be determined from the perspective of a particular group, e.g., a "reasonable AfricanAmerican" or a "reasonable Jew." 123 As the Second Circuit has explained:
Title VII seeks to protect those that are the targets of such conduct, and it is their perspective, not that of bystanders or the speaker, that is pertinent. Second, this standard makes clear that triers of fact are not to determine whether some ethnic or gender groups are more thin-skinned than others. Such an inquiry would at best concern largely indeterminate and fluid matters varying according to location, time, and current events. It might also lead to evidence, argument, and deliberations regarding supposed group characteristics and to undesirable, even ugly, jury and courtroom scenes. 124 Taken together, this well-settled precedent suggests that whether a hostile environment exists hinges on the experience of the target of the speech, not the race or perspective of the speaker. The longstanding recognition that the reasonable person standard is the proper basis for determining whether unwelcome conduct is sufficiently pervasive and severe to create a hostile work environment also provides additional support for the assertion that Johnson and Weatherly were correctly decided. 125 After all, the shameful historical legacy of the Nword underscores the extent to which a reasonable person of any race would likely object to its use at the workplace, even if the speaker is black.
Despite its relatively innocent origin, the N-word had become a common racial slur by the nineteenth century. 126 To persons of all races, the N-word evokes a history of racial violence, brutality, and subordination. Times may have changed, but to many Americans, the negative connotation of the N-word has not. For example, to media mogul Oprah Winfrey, the N-word still evokes images of racially motivated lynchings. 127 In The Butler, a black character describes the Nword as "a white man's word . . . filled with hate." 128 As mentioned earlier, the NAACP literally buried the N-word at a historically black cemetery to symbolize the NAACP's commitment to end hate. 129 Prominent members of the black community, including the late Maya Angelou, have publicly criticized use of the N-word and decried it as a racial slur. 130 Even nonblacks immersed in black culture (i.e., rap artists, spoken word artists, and racialized comedians) rarely use the word. 131 Indeed, the N-word is such a powerful insult that its reach has spread beyond the black community to become a tool to denigrate other racial and ethnic groups at home and abroad. 132 The N-word has been described as "the most offensive and inflammatory racial slur in English, . . . a word expressive of racial hatred and bigotry," 133 and countless judicial opinions reflect this view. 134 In Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Insurance Company, the Seventh Circuit opined that "no single act can more quickly alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment than the use of an unambiguously racial epithet such as '[ni**er]' by a supervisor in the presence of his subordinates." 135 Likewise, in McGinest v. GTE Service Corp., the Ninth Circuit concluded that use of the N-word in reference to a black employee and the prevalence of racially charged graffiti at the workplace were "significant exacerbating factors in evaluating the severity of the racial hostility." 136 To many individuals both inside and outside the black community, use of the N-word is debasing. It is like the age-old joke: "What do you call a black man with a Ph.D.?" The response being: "a ni**er," 137 which reflects how dehumanizing and reductionist the word can be. Not surprisingly, the Honorable Andre M. Davis of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit penned a 2008 opinion piece in the Baltimore Sun to a man who called him a "ni**er" while he was a federal district court judge. 138 After being called the N-word by a pedestrian, Judge Davis wrote, "[Y]ou gave me a quite unexpected but not altogether unforeseeable flashback. In the shared journey of Americans to attain a society marked by mutual respect for the differences among us, one needn't travel far to be reminded how far we have to travel." 139 Outside the employment discrimination context, plaintiffs have argued that use of the N-word is outrageous conduct sufficient to intentionally inflict emotional distress, and that its use by an attorney or 132 . See KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 27 (noting that Arabs are often labeled "sand ni**ers" while the Irish are called the "ni**ers" of Europe).
133. juror, standing alone, is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a mistrial. 140 They have also argued that the word's use is so offensive that a target of the N-word who kills the speaker should have a count of first-degree murder reduced to second-degree murder on grounds of provocation. 141 Not surprisingly, many Americans of all races find the Nword patently offensive and inappropriate in virtually any setting, especially in the workplace. 142 Some have even pushed to abolish the word from the English language. 143 Despite guidance from the Supreme Court providing that objective severity should be determined from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position, some courts have considered a standard that takes into account the plaintiff's race, national origin, sex, and other protected characteristics. 144 For example, in Watkins v. Bowden, a black female brought race-and sex-based hostile work environment claims against her previous employers, alleging that they allowed conversations about African-American hair and sexuality at the workplace. 145 The plaintiff sought a jury instruction to determine whether a "reasonable African American or woman" would have considered the work environment to be hostile. 146 The district court considered her argument but ultimately denied her request, applying a reasonable person standard instead. 147 Likewise, in Richardson v. New York State Department of Correctional Service, a black female sued her employer, alleging that she was subject to a racially hostile environment in violation of Title VII. 148 Coworkers allegedly referred to Ms. Richardson as the N-word, and supervisors used the N-word in her presence. 149 Like in Watkins, the Second Circuit applied a reasonable person standard to determine the objective severity of the harassment, reasoning that although the perspective of the target is pertinent to the evaluation and Title VII aims to protect the target of offensive conduct, it is not the court's duty to 140 . KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 58-59, 62, 64-67, 81-83, 106-07 (observing that although such challenges are made, they are unlikely to prevail determine whether some members of ethnic or other groups are more impervious to insult than others. 150 These rulings comport with Johnson and Weatherly because, in both cases, the juries did not determine that a black supervisor's use of the N-word was acceptable merely because the supervisor spoke the words from the perspective of a black person. Nor did the juries determine the objective severity of the harassment from the perspective of a reasonable black person merely because the speakers and targets of the speech were both black. Instead, in both cases, the jurors applied a reasonable person standard to conclude that intraracial use of the N-word created a racially hostile work environment in violation of Title VII, regardless of the fact that the speaker and target were black. 151 Although most courts continue to apply a reasonable person standard when determining the objective severity of harassment in hostile work environment cases, in 2004, the Ninth Circuit appeared to apply a reasonable "African-American man" standard to deny summary judgment in part in a case involving allegations of race discrimination and a hostile work environment. 152 In that case, George McGinest, a black employee, sued GTE Service Corporation (GTE) under Title VII for creation of a racially hostile work environment, failure to promote due to race, and retaliation. 153 word and the phrase "white is right," appeared on the walls of the men's restroom, and weeks passed before it was removed. 158 In determining whether to grant GTE's motion for summary judgment, the court explained that "McGinest must show the existence of a genuine factual dispute as to 1) whether a reasonable African-American man would find the workplace so objectively and subjectively racially hostile as to create an abusive working environment; and 2) whether GTE failed to take adequate remedial and disciplinary action." 159 Put differently, "allegations of a racially hostile workplace must be assessed from the perspective of a reasonable person belonging to the racial or ethnic group of the plaintiff." 160 Courts adopting a "reasonable black person" standard may rely on Oncale to argue that the Supreme Court refashioned the "reasonable person standard" articulated in Harris to take into account other relevant factors including the victim's ethnicity, sex, or race. 161 Harris referred to "an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive." 162 In Oncale, however, the Supreme Court stated that "the objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position, considering 'all the circumstances.'" 163 Some courts have construed "in the plaintiff's position, considering all the circumstances" to permit use of a customized standard based on the characteristics of the plaintiff, including race. Yet even that language does not definitively suggest that the race of the target of the speaker should be dispositive in determining whether use of the N-word constitutes race discrimination, and Oncale involved same-sex harassment, not race discrimination.
To justify this interpretation, some argue that racially motivated comments or actions that seem innocent or minimally offensive to someone outside the targeted group could be perceived as abusive from the perspective of a plaintiff who is a member of the group. Indeed, " [ 164. Harris v. Int'l Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1516 (noting that "instances of racial violence or threatened violence which might appear to white observers as mere 'pranks' are, to adopting the reasonable black person standard have also observed that consideration of the existence and severity of discrimination from the perspective of a reasonable person of the plaintiff's race better recognizes forms of discrimination that are real and hurtful but could easily be missed if considered solely from the perspective of someone of a different race than the plaintiff. 165 Adoption of the reasonable black person standard is especially pertinent when one considers that some black individuals use the N-word as a term of solidarity or affection. According to Professor Clarence Major, the N-word used by one black person to refer to another is a "racial term with undertones of warmth and goodwill." 166 In a 2009 interview, black rapper Jay-Z explained, "People give words power. . . .
[O]ur generation . . . took the power out of that word. We turned a word that was very ugly and hurtful into a term of endearment . . . ." 167 Similarly, in Nigger in the Window, Helen Jackson Lee observes that the N-word is a "piece-of-clay word that you could shape . . . to express your feelings." 168 Professor Randall Kennedy observes that blacks who use the N-word do not care if it makes members of other races or even other blacks uncomfortable; rather, they "care principally, perhaps exclusively, about what they themselves think, desire, and enjoy." 169 According to author Bruce A. Jacobs, "To proclaim oneself a [ni**er] is to declare to the disapproving mainstream, 'You can't fire me. I quit.' . . . To growl that one is a [ni**a] is a seductive gesture . . . that can feel bitterly empowering." 170 Perhaps for this reason, Professor Mari Matsuda argues that to disallow intraracial use of the N-word further victimizes blacks by "misunderstanding their linguistic and cultural norms." 171 Although these points are well taken, they do not justify application of a different and certainly no less onerous standard in race-based hostile environment cases arising from intraracial use of the N-word. To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff must also show that the conduct or speech was unwelcome and that she subjectively perceived it as abusive. 172 Concerns regarding whether the target of the speech was subjectively offended by the speech even though it was intraracial are more properly addressed when assessing whether the conduct was subjectively unwelcome, not when evaluating the objective severity of the alleged harassment. Furthermore, although the Oncale Court stated that the "objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position, considering 'all the circumstances,'" it elaborated that in same-sex harassment cases, "all the circumstances" means "consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target." 173 The Oncale Court illustrated this point by observing that a football player's work environment differs substantially from that of a coach's secretary working in an office. 174 Thus, while the coach smacking a player's buttocks as he enters the field might not rise to the level of a Title VII violation, the same behavior toward the coach's secretary would certainly be inappropriate at the office. 175 It is undisputed that behavior and language that may be acceptable in rap lyrics, on the field, or in the locker room may not always acceptable at the office. As the Supreme Court explained:
The real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed. Common sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing among members of the same sex, and conduct which a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would find severely hostile or abusive. 176 Notably, nowhere does the Court mention the race of the speaker nor the target of the speech. Nor did the Supreme Court explicitly include race, sex, or ethnicity in the "constellation of surrounding circumstances." 177 172. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 23 (1993).
173. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
Id.

Id. But see Tim Daniels, NFL Expected To Create 15-Yard Penalty for Use of Racial Slur,
BLEACHER REPORT (Feb. 22, 2014), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1970032-nfl-expected-tocreate-15-yard-penalty-for-use-of-racial-slur?utm_source=cnn.com&utm_medium=referral&utm _campaign=editorial&hpt=hp_t2 (contemplating imposition of a fifteen-yard penalty for use of racial slur during the game and complete ejection for subsequent use of a racial slur).
176. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81-82.
Id.
To be clear, we do not suggest that courts should entirely ignore the "constellation of surrounding circumstances" when assessing whether a work environment is hostile. To the contrary, appropriate sensitivity to the social context of the alleged harassment will enable courts and juries to recognize conduct that a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would find severely hostile or abusive. 178 The inclusion of details regarding the context of the speech, such as where and when the alleged harassing marks were made, may ensure that a jury considers "whether the conduct would be offensive to a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position . . . and may help ensure that the jury view[s] the conduct from the plaintiff's perspective." 179 However, the standards controlling what might be acceptable in society at large do not necessarily correspond to what is legally permissible in the workplace. 180 Infusion of race into assessments of the objective severity of racebased harassment "may perpetuate negative stereotypes or insert into the case prejudicial or inflammatory material that has no relevance to the plaintiff's experience." 181 However, "[t]he purpose of Title VII is not to import into the workplace the prejudices of the community, but through law to liberate the workplace from the demeaning influence of discrimination, and thereby to implement the goals of human dignity and economic equality in employment." 182 Finally, although white supremacists originally used the N-word to denigrate blacks, evidence suggests that now some members of the black community still use the word to insult members of their own race. 183 Thus, the word could still create a racially hostile work environment even if judged from a reasonable black person's perspective. For example, a black person may refer to another black person as the N-word to denote laziness, bad behavior, lack of intelligence, or other negative traits. 184 As a result, even this intraracial use connotes inferiority, insult, and may cause offense. 185 negative history, it is unsurprising that a reasonable person of any race could find its use at the workplace offensive.
F. The Automaticity of Race Bias and Use of the N-Word
Conventional wisdom and even "naïve" psychological conceptions of human thought and social behavior 186 place great weight on accessible thoughts and conscious intentions as informing expressly held beliefs and volitional behavior. 187 An express belief is one that is consciously endorsed, and a conscious intention to act exists when the actor purposefully engages in behavior for some specific reason. 188 The challenge to such an assessment is that it has long been known that social influences operating within interview and research settings can lead individuals to inaccurately describe their explicit beliefs. 189 Furthermore, people's explanations of their behavior sometimes consist of a mere groping for answers, thus producing often improbable answers. 190 Contrary to the notion that human thoughts and behaviors are purely accessible and volitional, the vast and growing body of research on implicit social cognition suggests that individuals lack both absolute awareness of their own thoughts and the ability to control behaviors that flow from those thoughts. Such mental processes include implicit memory, 191 195 and implicit selfconcept. 196 Implicit memory research from the 1980s led to the development of measures to assess other implicit mental phenomena, including implicit attitudes and implicit stereotypes. An attitude is a hypothetical construct that represents the degree to which an individual likes or dislikes or acts favorably or unfavorably toward someone or something. 197 People may also be ambivalent about a person, a group of people, or an object, such that they are imbued with both positive and negative attitudes about the object in question. Attitudes are implicit when they lie outside of conscious awareness. Professors Anthony G. Greenwald and Mahzarin R. Banaji define implicit attitudes as "introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate favorable or unfavorable feeling, thought, or action toward social objects." 198 Implicit attitudes are of greatest interest when they are different from explicit attitudes about the same category of individuals or things. Such discrepancies, referred to as "dissociations," are often observed in attitudes toward stigmatized groups, such as groups defined by age, disability, ethnicity, sex, religion, sexual orientation, and race. 199 On the other hand, a social stereotype is a mental association made between, for example, a social group and a trait. 200 Such an association may or may not be grounded in a statistical reality. If the association is grounded in empirical reality, group members who are the subject of the mental association will be more likely to display the associated trait than members of other groups. 201 Implicitly, such stereotypes are "the introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identi-[Vol. 64:65 fied) traces of past experience that mediate attributions of qualities to members of a social category." 202 A bias reflects a preference for a particular group or category over another group or category. Accordingly, within biases, there are opposite sides to the same coin-favorable and unfavorable categorizations of comparative groups. For example, in-group bias designates favoritism toward one's own group or groups. 203 Not surprisingly, implicit attitudes and stereotypes may result in discriminatory biases. 204 These biases are called "implicit biases," which may diverge from an individual's express beliefs and result in behavior inconsistent with the individual's intended behavior.
Within the social and behavioral sciences, the typical method of attitude measurement has been the collection of self-reports, which reflect an individual's explicit attitudes. For example, when researchers want to ascertain subjects' attitudes toward something, they usually ask participants to select one of several given responses, or to complete a rating scale. 205 The drawback in using these methods is that some respondents may be unwilling or unable to report their attitudes in an unbiased or accurate manner. 206 Moreover, research respondents' answers are context dependent-e.g., who asks the question and how it is asked. 207 These concerns gave rise to the creation of research measures that indirectly gauge attitudes. Presumably, research participants are unaware of the relationship between these measures and the attitudes they are employed to ascertain. Indirect measures also seem to minimize respondents' strategic responding. 208 Accordingly, these measures have evolved from projective tests 209 to a wide variety of contemporary techniques, which fall into three general categories: (1) reaction time measures; 210 (2) language measures; 211 and (3) psychophysiological measures. 212 An exhaustive account of the variety of implicit measures exceeds the scope of this article. 213 However, among the most typically used measures are subliminal priming and the Implicit Association Test (IAT). 214 Cognitive psychology research into subliminal priming indicates that exposure to a concept facilitates the later recognition of related concepts. 215 As Professors Bernd Wittenbrink and Norbert Schwarz explain, "A common explanation for this phenomenon holds that exposure to the initial concept (the prime) activates semantically related concepts in memory, thus reducing the time needed for their identification." 216 Researchers have developed various priming procedures to measure attitudes derived from the seminal work of Professors David E. Meyer and Roger W. Schvaneveldt. 217 In two different experiments, subjects were simultaneously presented with two strings of letters, one string displayed visually above the other. 218 In the first experiment, participants responded "yes" if both strings were words; otherwise they responded "no." 219 In the second experiment, participants responded "same" if the two strings were either both words or both nonwords; otherwise they responded "different." 220 Participants responded "yes" or "same" for pairs of commonly associated words more quickly than they did for pairs of unassociated words. "Same" responses were slowest for nonword pairs. "No" responses were faster when the top string in the display was a nonword, whereas "different" responses came more quickly when the top string was a word. 222 As has been demonstrated in countless replication studies, participants make such decisions more quickly when the prime 223 and target string share some semantic relationship. 224 So, in theory, the prime activates semantically related concepts in long-term memory, resulting in faster recognition of and response to related targets. 225 Professor Russell H. Fazio and his colleagues believed that such a priming technique could be extended to attitudes. 226 To test this, they subliminally presented an object to participants in the study, and then tested the extent to which that object would evoke positive or negative attitudes later. 227 Professor Fazio and his colleagues found greater facilitation "when positively valued primes were followed by positive targets and when negatively valued primes were followed by negative targets than when the prime-target pairs were incongruent in valence." 228 Almost a decade later, Professor Fazio and his colleagues extended this technique to racial attitudes. 229 Specifically, they used black and white faces as primes, and adjectives with positive or negative connotations, for example, "good" and "bad." 230 Participants had to push keys labeled either "good" or "bad" as quickly as possible. 231 White participants' reaction times to the "good" words were faster following presentation of white faces. 232 Their reaction times to the "bad" 222. Id. at 231-32. 223. In the evaluative priming method, subjects classify each of a series of target words based on the target word's evaluative meaning, with each target word immediately preceded by a tobe-ignored prime word. Prime-target evaluative congruence facilitates responding to the target, producing variation in response latencies that can be used to measure automatic evaluation of the prime category. Greenwald words were quicker when those words followed the presentation of black faces. 233 Building upon Professor Fazio's work, the IAT has become the dominant attitude measure employed to circumvent strategic responding or responding that merely reflects a lack of insight on the part of respondents. 234 The IAT assesses the ease with which individuals associate various categories based on reaction times. 235 Accordingly, the IAT permits an inference about attitudes because it is generally easier to respond quickly to items from two categories that are cognitively associated with each other. 236 The most widely used IAT (the Race IAT) assesses implicit attitudes toward blacks vis-à-vis whites. 237 In the Race IAT, study participants first practice distinguishing black and white faces by responding to images of faces by pressing a computer key on the left side of the keyboard for one racial category and on the right side of the keyboard for another racial category. 238 Participants next practice distinguishing positive adjectives words from negative adjectives in a manner similar to that used for distinguishing black and white faces. 239 The next two tasks, given in a randomly determined order, use all four categories (black faces, white faces, positive adjectives, and negative adjectives). 240 One task requires one response, for example, pressing a left-side key, when the respondent sees black faces or positive words, whereas white faces and negative words call for the other response, for example, pressing a right-side key. 241 In the remaining task, white faces share a response with positive words and black faces with negative words. 242 For American respondents who take the Race IAT, response speeds are often faster when white faces are paired with positive words. 243 This finding supports the conclusion that white-positive is a stronger association than black-positive (and conversely, white-negative is a weaker association than black-negative). In the context of racial bias, these results suggest an implicit attitudinal preference for whites over 233 blacks. 244 The IAT's general method can be, and has been, adapted to measure a wide variety of group-valence and group-trait associations underlying attitudes and stereotypes. 245 Implicit attitudes are unremarkable in the sense that people harbor them with respect to a wide variety of things. One study found that people hold implicit attitudes about things as simple as yogurt brands, fast food restaurants, and soft drinks. 246 Certainly, in such a context, these implicit attitudes may predict behavior that may largely be deemed as inconsequential, at least with respect to any macro-level considerations. 247 However, group identities may provide for a heightened level of concern. For example, Americans tend to implicitly favor the United States over Japan and "American" over "Canadian." 248 Not surprisingly, they implicitly favor American places over foreign places. 249 They also implicitly favor thin people over obese people, and young people over old people. 250 Heterosexuals are favored over homosexuals, rich over poor, and Jews over Muslims-all implicitly. 251 Research on implicit racial attitudes and bias-particularly research focused on blacks-is the most robust area of implicit attitudes and bias research. 252 As previously indicated, people's explicit and implicit attitudes are often not completely concordant. 253 This may be no more evident than when it comes to the hotbed issue of race. For example, research suggests that Latinos demonstrate a fairly limited explicit preference for whites (25.3% favor) over blacks (15.0% favor), with most showing no preference (59.7%). 254 Research on blacks' implicit racial biases is striking for two reasons. First, like research on other racial groups, there is a lack of concordance between blacks' explicit and implicit racial attitudes. 263 Second, although blacks show an explicit preference for blacks (58.9%) over whites (4.8%), with 36.2% showing no preference, the same cannot be said implicitly. 264 At the implicit level, some research shows that blacks have no preference at all, with 34.1% favoring blacks, 32.4% favoring whites, and 33.6% showing no preference. 265 Other research bolsters these findings. For example, among twelveto fourteen-year-old blacks, Professor Andrew Scott Baron and his colleagues found that, at least by age thirteen, young blacks do not exhibit the in-group preference that has come to be the hallmark of whites. 266 Professor C. Vincent Spicer found that among black adults, there is considerable variability in blacks' implicit racial preferences, though overall, blacks show a significant preference for whites over blacks. 267 A study by Professor Spicer and his colleagues demonstrates that between 50% and 65% of blacks exhibit implicit outgroup bias in favor of whites. 268 Professor Lesile Ashburn-Nardo and her colleagues found that 60% of blacks show a pro-white implicit bias, although they express highly favorable in-group attitudes on explicit measures. 269 Professor Nosek and his colleagues' Internet-based study found that blacks show a significant preference for whites over blacks. 270 There, more blacks expressed in-group favoritism on explicit measures (65.4%) than on implicit measures (40.1%). 271 When attitudes are measured implicitly, 39.3% of blacks show out-group favoritism, which is about the same proportion that showed in-group favoritism. 272 In sum, blacks show strong in-group favoritism explicitly, but not implicitly. 273 A proliferation of scholarship on employment discrimination highlights how implicit race bias may influence cognitive judgment and decision-making in the employment context. For example, Professors Eric Louis Uhlmann and Geoffrey L. Cohen found that job discrimination may occur when people redefine merit in a manner that fits the idiosyncratic credentials of individual applicants from desired groups. 274 Participants were assigned male and female applicants to gender-stereotypical jobs. 275 However, participants did not view male and female applicants as having different strengths and weaknesses. 276 Instead, they redefined the criteria for success at the job as requiring the precise credentials possessed by a candidate of the desired sex. 277 While this study focused on sex differences, the finding could be similarly applied to racial categories.
In a collection of studies, Professor Devah Pager concluded that having a criminal record affects the job prospects of blacks and whites differently. 278 In one study, twenty-three-year-old black and white male testers were matched based on physical appearance and selfpresentational styles. 279 Characteristics that were not naturally identical between pairs, such as educational attainment and work experience, were made similar for purposes of the study. 280 Testers were divided into pairs, and one tester was to present himself as having a criminal record. 281 The testers then applied for entry-level positions requiring no previous work experience and no education greater than high school identified in the Sunday classified advertisement section of a large Midwestern city newspaper. 282 Professor Pager found that the negative effect of a criminal record was 40% greater for blacks than it was for whites. 283 In a similar follow-up study, Professor Pager found that while more than 60% of employers indicated a willingness to hire a black or white drug offender, only 17% of employers gave callbacks to white testers. 284 In contrast, less than a third of that percentage of employers gave black testers callbacks. 285 In another noted study, Professors Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan sent fictitious résumés in response to classified advertisements in Chicago and Boston newspapers. 286 They manipulated perceived race by randomly assigning the résumés either a blacksounding name or a white-sounding name. 287 Employers were 50% more likely to invite individuals with white-sounding names for interviews. 288 They also found that for white-sounding names, higher quality résumés elicited 30% more callback invitations. 289 elicited a far smaller increase in callbacks. 290 They also found that the degree of discrimination is uniform across occupations and, to a lesser extent, industries. 291 Professors Bertrand and Mullainathan found that even federal contractors and employers who described themselves as "equal opportunity employers" discriminate as much as other employers. 292 While these studies do not employ the IAT and do not specifically focus on hostile work environment discrimination, they highlight the fact that employers and supervisors may often make employment decisions that are discriminatory and influenced by unconscious biases. In fact, the Bertrand and Mullainathan study utilizes an oft-employed priming technique to determine the extent to which explicit information that conjures up implicit imagery-for example, racialized names-influences judgment and decision making. 293 In fact, employers with self-perceptions as rational and fair in their hiring, promotion, and retention decision making, coupled with unconscious biases, actually have the tendency to increase employment discrimination. 294 Two studies underscore how use of the N-word in the employment context can create a hostile work environment. In 1985, social psychologists Jeff Greenberg and Tom Pyszczynski asked black and white college students to judge a debate. 295 They planted individuals in the audience who, immediately after the debate, either referred to the black students as the N-word, criticized them in a nonracist manner, or said nothing. 296 Their study indicated that observers who overheard the insult were likelier to lower their evaluation of the black debaters. 297 This suggests that racial slurs "can indeed cue prejudiced behavior in those who are exposed." 298 In a more recent study, social psychologists Laurie Rudman and Richard Ashmore found that not only do implicit racial bias scores predict economic discrimination against black student organizations, but they also predict the use of racial slurs. 299 The narrative concerning how implicit antiblack racial biases manifest themselves in behavior among black actors, as opposed to nonblack actors, has yet to be fully explored by social scientists. However, taken together, the existing body of research supports the outcomes in Johnson and Weatherly because it suggests that implicit race bias may result in discriminatory use of the N-word by and among blacks, thus creating a hostile work environment for employees on the receiving end of the word. Simply put, black supervisors may be just as likely as white supervisors to discriminate against black employees on the basis of race or to use the N-word at the workplace in a discriminatory way.
G. Promoting Fairness, Consistency, and Judicial Efficiency
Application of the same reasonable person standard to hostile work environment claims involving intraracial and interracial use of the Nword will also promote fairness. After all, whether or not nonblacks can and should use the N-word has been hotly debated. In a recent episode of Fox's television drama Boston Public, a white student calls a black friend the N-word, causing an offended black student to challenge the white student to a fight. 300 The students' white teacher leads a discussion about the N-word that is based on Professor Kennedy's controversial book, Nigger: The Strange Career of a Troublesome Word, and a black teacher asks that the white teacher be terminated for using the N-word. 301 Although this fictional example may seem somewhat extreme, it is not far from reality.
"Niggas in Paris" won a Grammy in 2012 and sold 436,000 copies in a week. 302 Yet white actress Gwyneth Paltrow came under fire for reportedly using "ni**as" in a tweet discussing the hit song. 303 Rihanna thought it was appropriate to publicly post a photo of herself with a black toddler captioned "My lil nigga." 304 actress and singer Jennifer Lopez used the N-word in a remix of her hit song "I'm Real," civil rights activists demanded an apology, and a New York radio station threatened to boycott her music. 305 Likewise, after white Food Network star Paula Deen admitted to using the Nword in the past, her sponsors withdrew their support, signaling an end to her television career. 306 White television personality Bill Maher came to her defense, asking whether rap songs using the Nword should be banned. 307 310 Whether the N-word can only ever mean one thing, or whether it is only appropriate when used by and among members of the black community, has long been the subject of scholarly and public debate. According to Professor Randall Kennedy, "words can be used in all sorts of ways. We are the masters of words." 311 As such, he states that it is sometimes acceptable for white people to use the N-word. 312 For example, white author Carl Van Vechten named his book exploring the life of black people in Harlem Nigger Heaven, and white director Quentin Tarantino often uses the N-word in the screenplays of his award-winning films, such as Pulp Fiction. 313 Professor Kennedy argues that such uses are acceptable because they do not aim to oppress or demean the black community; instead, they intend to reflect the realities of the lives of black Americans and the way members of the black community speak and relate to one another. 314 However, many members of the black community disagree. Some argue that white racists' historical use of the N-word to subordinate blacks, standing alone, disqualifies nonblacks from using the word. 315 A second theory posits that "equity earned through oppression grants cultural ownership rights"; put differently, blacks suffered through denigrating use of the N-word, so they have purchased the exclusive rights to "monopolize the slur's peculiar cultural capital." 316 Still others argue that nonblacks, even those who associate closely with members of the black community, will never have sufficient intimate knowledge of the N-word to ever be able to use it appropriately. 317 As Michael Dyson, Professor of African-American Studies at DePaul University, states bluntly, "Here's a rule of thumb for all white Americans . . . as to how to use the [N-word]-Never! See? So that's a general rule of thumb." 318 Likewise, black comedian Chris Rock's popular comedy album includes a skit in which a white man approaches him after a performance of his "I hate ni**ers" skit. 319 The white man appreciatively repeats some of Mr. Rock's N-word jokes, and the next sound you hear is the white man being punched. 320 Such visceral reactions to use of the N-word by nonblacks is more the rule than the exception. Operating under the often false assumption that nonblacks' use of the N-word can only ever mean one thing has led to what Professor Kennedy calls "troubling tendencies," such as blacks' "overeagerness to detect insult" and "overly harsh punishment[s] of those who use the N-word imprudently or even wrongly." 321 This not only poses fairness and consistency concerns, but could also prompt frivolous lawsuits that impede judicial efficiency.
Is the "N-
For example, in 1993, Central Michigan University (CMU) fired a white basketball coach who stated that the team needed "to have more ni**ers on the team" during a locker room pep talk even though the coach asked the team members, both black and white, for permission to use the word and used it in a positive way to refer to players who were "fearless, mentally strong, and tough." 322 It is telling that no team member complained; instead, a student who had quit the team before the pep talk had occurred lodged the complaint that eventually resulted in the coach's termination. 323 Although his use of the N-word was indisputably unnecessary and ill-advised, would CMU have terminated a black coach that used the word in the exact same way?
In perhaps an even better illustration of these so-called "troubling tendencies," David Howard, a white director of a Washington, D.C. agency, was forced to resign after his subordinates mistook his use of the word "niggardly" as a racial slur. 324 It is beyond dispute that "niggardly" means "miserly" and is not a racial slur. 325 Yet in the public firestorm that ensued, that indisputable fact seemed lost on Mr. Howard's critics. 326 As columnist Tony Snow quipped, "David Howard got fired because some people in public employ were morons who a) didn't know the meaning of 'niggardly,' b) didn't know how to use a dictionary to discover the word's meaning [,] Howard's coworkers were not the only individuals to misconstrue the meaning of "niggardly." At the University of Wisconsin-Madison, a student allegedly stormed out of a class crying when the professor used the word during a Chaucer lecture even though he had previously explained the definition to the entire class. Id. at 123.
Unfortunately, these "troubling tendencies" have also found their way into the courtroom, arguably leading to frivolous litigation and "overly harsh punishments of those who use the N-word," even when the speaker lacked racist or otherwise malicious intent. 328 Burlington v. News Corporation highlights the problem that arises when people falsely assume that the N-word can only mean one thing. 329 In Burlington, an award-winning white reporter sued News Corporation, Fox Television Stations, Inc., and Fox Television Stations of Philadelphia, Inc. for reverse discrimination because the defendants terminated him for using the N-word at a meeting of three black and six white employees. 330 Mr. Burlington sought to hold the defendants liable for the discriminatory animus of his coworkers under a theory of "subordinate bias liability." 331 The incident occurred during a discussion of reporter Robin Taylor's story about the NAACP's symbolic burial of the N-word. 332 Although Ms. Taylor used the term "N-word" during her discussion of the story, when she finished, Mr. Burlington asked "Does this mean we can finally say the word 'ni**er?'" 333 When Ms. Taylor said she would not use the full word in her story, Mr. Burlington suggested that she either write "ni**er" or refer to it as the "racial epithet" instead of using the phrase the "N-word." 334 In response, a black employee, Nicole Wolfe, became visibly upset and exclaimed, "I can't believe you just said that!" 335 After the meeting, Mr. Burlington approached Ms. Wolfe to explain, but Ms. Wolfe would not speak with him. 336 Later, Joyce Evans, a black co-anchor who had not attended the meeting, told Mr. Burlington that he had upset some of his coworkers. 337 Mr. Burlington opted to individually approach his coworkers to explain his rationale. 338 quirements of the employee assistance program, the Station refused to put him back on the air or renew his contract. 352 Mr. Burlington sued, alleging discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII and other statutes. 353 In denying in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court observed that the meaning of the N-word varies in "color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." 354 In analyzing the historical and contemporary usage of the N-word, the court acknowledged that although the word has historically been used as a tool of oppression, it has more recently been utilized as a term of endearment within the black community. 355 The court correctly concluded that the defendants were not permitted to draw race-based distinctions between employees because doing so would contravene the spirit and purpose of Title VII. 356 To prevail in his suit, Mr. Burlington had to show that he was qualified for his job and suffered an adverse employment action-in this case, suspension and nonrenewal of his contract-under circumstances giving rise to an inference that the adverse employment action occurred because of a protected trait-here, his race. 357 In the Third Circuit, a plaintiff may create an inference of discrimination by establishing "a causal nexus between the harm suffered and the plaintiff's membership in a protected class, from which a juror could infer, in light of common experience, that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent." 358 To establish an inference of discrimination, Mr. Burlington pointed to three black comparators who spoke or wrote the N-word but whom the Station did not discipline. 359 For example, Mr. Burlington claimed that a black coworker, David Huddleston, once referred to the subject of a story as "one dumb ni**er." 360 The defendants countered that the aforementioned instance occurred when the station had a different manager, 361 and "where there are different decision makers, employ-ination. 372 To prevail, the plaintiff must "point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action." 373 In Burlington, the court concluded that a reasonable jury, considering the totality of the circumstances, could find that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating factor or determinative cause of Mr. Burlington's termination, or that the defendants' legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons were not the real reasons for Mr. Burlington's termination. 374 The Burlington court faced a difficult question: may an employer be held liable under Title VII for perpetuating the common societal convention that it is acceptable for blacks, but not whites, to say the Nword? In reaching its decision, the court acknowledged that historically, many whites had used the N-word to oppress or denigrate, while blacks had utilized the word in ironic, satirical ways or as a sign of affection. 375 Still, the court was not persuaded that the historical use of the N-word was "a justifiable reason for permitting the [station] to draw race-based distinctions between employees." 376 To the contrary, Title VII was enacted to counter social norms perpetuating race discrimination; thus, " [t] o conclude that the [station] may act in accordance with the social norm . . . would require a determination that this is a 'good' race-based social norm that justifies a departure from the text of Title VII." 377 The court determined that a triable issue of fact existed regarding whether coworkers "exhibiting discriminatory animus influenced or participated in the [station's] decision to terminate" Mr. Burlington. 378 Perhaps for reasons of judicial efficiency, Professor Kennedy has argued that it is probably erroneous to conclude that the [N-word] itself necessarily furnishes proof of racial discrimination, even when the speaker is white and the target black. . . . [However,] [a]utomatic labeling of ni**er may be an efficient shorthand method for judicially assessing the N-word . . . . [which reflects the notion that] it is better to err on the side of overenforcement rather than underenforcement. 379 Thus, application of a reasonable person standard in all instances involving use of the N-word at the workplace, regardless of the race of the speaker and target of the speech, will promote judicial efficiency and uniformity. In Johnson and Weatherly, that seems to be precisely what happened. Arguments regarding whether the target did not find the speech offensive because of the speaker's race are more properly considered in the "unwelcomeness" prong of the hostile work environment analysis. Therefore, application of the reasonable person standard to judge the objective severity of intraracial use of the Nword combats "troubling tendencies" and promotes fairness, consistency, and judicial efficiency.
H. Conclusion
When examining the implications of the N-word in race-based hostile environment claims, the reasonable person standard employed to determine the severity of the alleged harassment should be colorblind. For this reason, the outcomes in Johnson and Weatherly are correct because it is well settled that employment discrimination can occur between parties of the same race. Given the N-word's long history as a tool of oppression, racism, and denigration, it can reasonably be construed by members of all races as offensive, regardless of the speaker's and target's race. Implicit social cognition research underscores the argument that use of the N-word may flow from conscious or subconscious antiblack sentiment, even when used intraracially. Finally, applying the same legal standard to intraracial use of the Nword at the workplace promotes fairness, consistency, judicial efficiency, and hopefully, racial tolerance.
